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As their economic clout increases, emerging powers are becoming policy-shapers in their own 
right. This chapter evaluates the ways in which emerging countries have made use of the 
flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement to espouse their social and economic concerns. 
We consider one of the most significant and controversial of these flexibilities: compulsory 
licensing as a tool for providing access to essential medicines. Our analysis focuses on India and 
Brazil as the two most vocal actors on the international scene opposing strong intellectual 
property (IP) protection. It compares Brazil and India’s patterns of domestic implementation so as 
to gain a more granular understanding of the law and practice of compulsory licensing in these 
countries. A further aim of the chapter is to determine whether coordination, learning or emulation 
has taken place between these countries. If it has, does it explain the diffusion of compulsory 
licensing practices and, if not, what has led to the particular implementation design chosen? The 
results are somewhat puzzling, but all the more interesting as they reveal that India and Brazil, 
despite their shared IP strategies at the international level, have chosen different TRIPS 
implementation paths domestically. We find no evidence of coordination but of processes of 
learning and emulation taking place. 
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Making	use	of	TRIPS	flexibilities:	implementation	and	diffusion	of	compulsory	
licensing	regimes	in	Brazil	and	India	
	
	
I.	Introduction	
	
Global	 public	 health	 is	 one	 of	 the	 areas	 in	which	 emerging	 countries	 have	 taken	 a	 critical	 role	 in	
shaping	international	rules.	As	early	on	as	the	Uruguay	Round	Negotiations,	which	ultimately	led	to	
the	adoption	of	 the	Agreement	on	Trade-related	Aspects	of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights	 (TRIPS)1	as	
part	 of	 the	World	 Trade	Organization	 (WTO),	 Brazil	 and	 India	 assumed	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 opposing	
stronger	intellectual	property	(IP)	protection.	Ultimately,	these	countries	only	acquiesced	because	of	
the	pressures	of	the	WTO	single	undertaking	and	the	inherent	bargains	that	linked	IP	protection	to	
improved	market	 access	 for	 textiles	 and	 agriculture	 (Deere	 Birkbeck	 2008).	 Post-TRIPS,	 India	 and	
particularly	Brazil,	have	continued	to	lead	coalitions	of	developing	countries	with	the	aim	of	limiting	
and	calibrating	the	impact	of	the	changes	brought	about	by	the	TRIPS	Agreement.		
	
These	 efforts	 have	 involved	 launching	 agendas	 on	 diverse	 development	 issues	 such	 as:	 access	 to	
medicines,	 the	 linkage	between	human	 rights	and	health,	protection	of	 traditional	knowledge	and	
access	 to	biological	 resources	 (Kapczynski	 2008).	 These	 initiatives	have	been	 taken	up	 in	different	
international	 venues,	among	 them	the	WTO,	 the	World	 Intellectual	Property	Organization	 (WIPO),	
the	 World	 Health	 Organization	 (WHO)	 and	 the	 Convention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity	 (CBD).	 As	 we	
discuss	 later	 on,	 Brazil	 and	 India	 have	 been	 especially	 successful	 in	 transforming	 the	 norms	
governing	global	health,	thus	establishing	one	of	the	few	areas	in	which	it	is	possible	to	observe	real	
rule	shaping	by	emerging	actors.		
	
Not	 all	 emerging	 countries	 have	 taken	 the	 same	 approach.	While	 on	 the	 surface	 it	 is	 opposed	 to	
Western-dominated	 IP	 regimes,	 China	 “has	 been	 reluctant	 to	 press	 for	 a	 structural	 reform	 of	
intellectual	 property	 rights	 regulation	 in	 the	 WTO,	 despite	 lending	 its	 support	 to	 developing	
countries	when	the	negotiations	over	the	Decision	on	 Implementation	of	Paragraph	6	of	 the	Doha	
Declaration	were	under	way”	(Chan	2010:	115).	Thus,	while	nominally	in	favour	of	these	initiatives,	
China	has	pursued	a	 less	 contentious	approach.	Other	emerging	economies,	 such	as	Mexico,	have	
distanced	 themselves	 from	 these	 international	 efforts,	 seeking	 to	 act	 as	 mediators	 between	
industrialized	and	 industrializing	countries.	This	position	has	proved	hard	to	maintain	and	even	 led	
to	 a	 heated	 exchange	 between	 the	 Brazilian,	 Argentinian	 and	 Mexican	 delegates	 during	 the	
launching	of	the	WIPO	Development	Agenda	(see	WIPO	IIM/1/6	PROV.2).2		
	
Given	 their	 salience,	 multilateral	 efforts	 by	 developing	 countries	 towards	 ensuring	 a	 balanced	
interpretation	 of	 TRIPS	 are	well	 documented	 (Drahos	 1997;	 Correa	 2000;	 Sykes	 2000;	 Panagariya	
2002;	 Bass	 2002/2003;	 Wade	 2003;	 Helfer	 2004;	 Yu	 2004;	 Kapczynski	 2008).	 Domestic	 efforts	
complementing	 and	 supporting	 these	 international	 initiatives	 have	 received	 much	 less	 attention.	
One	notable	exception	is	Birkbeck’s	(2008)	work	on	TRIPS’	implementation	by	developing	countries.	
That	 the	 countries	 leading	 multilateral	 efforts	 towards	 shaping	 the	 global	 health	 regime,	 mainly	
Brazil	and	India,	have	also	been	enacting	domestic	legislation	seeking	to	maximize	flexibilities	under	
TRIPS	is	an	interesting	empirical	observation.	Rule	shaping	can	be	a	result	of	multilateral	initiatives,	
but	 it	may	also	result	from	norm	evolution	through	domestic	practice	and	institutional	adaptation.	
We	suggest	that	the	interaction	between	the	international	and	the	national	level	needs	to	be	further	
explored,	so	that	we	can	understand	why	and	how	policies	are	enacted	and	implemented.	
																																								 																				
1	Agreement	 on	 Trade	 Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 15	 April	 1994,	 33	 I.L.M.	 81	 (1994)	
[hereinafter	cited	as	TRIPS	or	the	TRIPS	Agreement].	
2	http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=44609	(last	accessed	15	March	2016).	
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This	chapter	looks	into	one	of	the	most	salient	domestic	practices	and	its	evolution	in	the	post-TRIPS	
environment	–	that	of	compulsory	licensing	in	the	two	emerging	countries	that	were	the	most	vocal	
during	 the	 TRIPS	 negotiations.	 In	 so	 doing,	 it	 seeks	 to	 ascertain	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 two	
countries	have	learnt	from	or	emulated	each	other’s	experiences	and	whether	coordination	towards	
implementing	 flexibilities	 has	 taken	 place.	 The	 chapter	 first	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 compulsory	
licensing	norms	looking	at	their	origin	and	evolution,	which	is	an	important	aspect	for	consideration,	
as	matters	 in	this	context	cannot	simply	be	 labelled	as	good	or	bad,	pro-	or	counter-development.	
The	 second	 section	 looks	 at	 whether	 learning,	 emulation	 or	 coordination	 has	 taken	 place	 in	 the	
domestic	implementation	of	compulsory	licensing	norms.	The	third	section	provides	an	explanation	
for	 the	 significant	 differences	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 compulsory	 licensing	 norms	 by	 Brazil	 and	
India.	Finally,	the	conclusion	summarizes	the	main	findings	in	terms	of	both	the	motivation	for	and	
the	diffusion	of	particular	compulsory	licensing	policies.		
	
	
II.	Origins	and	evolution	of	compulsory	licensing	norms	
	
Compulsory	licensing	is	in	fact	an	old	construct	of	international	IP	law,	which	has	existed	ever	since	
the	1883	Paris	Convention.3	It	reflects	the	fundamental	idea	that	IP	rights	are	not	absolute,	and	that	
there	are	situations	that	demand	the	use	of	certain	IP	rights	without	the	consent	of	the	rights-holder,	
in	particular	for	the	protection	of	key	public	 interests.	While	the	TRIPS	Agreement	heightened	and	
harmonized	the	standards	of	international	patent	protection,	and	was	clearly	a	success	for	IP-based	
industries	 (Sell	 2003;	 Helfer	 2004),	 including	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 in	 fact	 it	 strengthened	
rather	 than	 weakened	 the	 compulsory	 licensing	 regime	 (Reichman/Hasendahl	 2003).	 In	 effect,	
developing	countries,	including	those	with	pharmaceutical	production	capabilities	such	as	India	and	
Brazil,	could	no	longer	reverse-engineer	patented	products,	as	their	domestic	laws	had	to	be	made	
TRIPS-compliant	by	2005.	They	could,	however,	use	the	flexibility	permitted	under	Article	31	TRIPS	
on	compulsory	licensing.	This	TRIPS	provision	is	fairly	openly	formulated	and	allows	governments	to	
grant	compulsory	licences	on	various	grounds,	including	public	interest,	anti-competitive	conduct	or	
for	non-commercial	government	use.	While	there	are	certain	conditions	attached,	such	as	a	duty	to	
notify	and	to	negotiate	with	the	affected	patentees,	even	these	specific	requirements	can	be	waived	
in	 cases	 of	 “national	 emergency	 or	 other	 circumstances	 of	 extreme	 urgency	 or	 in	 cases	 of	 public	
noncommercial	 use”	 (Article	 31(b)	 TRIPS).	 This	 outcome	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 victory	 for	 the	
developing	 countries,	 which	 were	 ably	 represented	 by	 the	 Indian	 delegation	 during	 the	 Uruguay	
negotiations	 (Watal	 2002:	 33-44;	 Watal	 2015:	 295-320)	 and	 managed	 to	 counterbalance	 the	
aggressive	IP	 industries’	 lobbying	and	the	strong	positions	of	 industrialized	countries.	On	the	other	
hand,	 this	 victory	 can	 also	 be	deemed	 relatively	modest	when	 compared	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 TRIPS	
obligations,	which	are	far-reaching	and	onerous.	It	should	also	be	stressed	that	although,	in	principle,	
developing	countries	could	use	compulsory	 licensing,	 in	 reality	many	of	 these	countries	 lacked	the	
capacity	to	manufacture	the	drugs.	It	is	critical	in	this	regard	to	understand	that	although	Article	31	
TRIPS	was	broad	in	scope	and	fairly	open	in	the	justifications	for	compulsory	licensing,	Article	31(f)	
expressly	required	products	manufactured	under	a	compulsory	licence	to	serve	“predominantly	for	
the	supply	of	the	domestic	market”	and	in	effect	limited	exports	to	49.9%	of	the	total	output.	
	
This	situation,	which,	in	reality,	restricted	the	protection	of	vital	public	health	interests	of	developing	
countries	 and	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 rather	 inimical	 behaviour	 of	 major	 pharmaceutical	
companies,	came	to	a	halt	in	2001.	At	that	time,	developing	country	members	of	the	WTO	made	the	
removal	 of	 the	 existing	 constraints	 on	 public	 health	 policies	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 the	 deal	 to	
launch	 the	 new,	Doha	 round	 of	 trade	 negotiations.	 The	 political	moment	was	 opportune	 and	 the	
																																								 																				
3	Paris	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Industrial	Property,	20	March	1883,	as	revised	at	Stockholm	(1967),	21	
UST	1583,	828	UNTS	305	[hereinafter	the	Paris	Convention].	
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Doha	Ministerial	Declaration	on	 the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	Public	Health4	of	2001	was	a	 significant	
breakthrough.	The	Declaration	affirmed	that	 the	TRIPS	Agreement	“can	and	should	be	 interpreted	
and	implemented	in	a	manner	supportive	of	WTO	Members’	rights	to	protect	public	health	and,	 in	
particular,	 to	 promote	 access	 to	 medicines	 for	 all”	 (para.	 4).	 The	 Doha	 Declaration	 went	 on	 to	
reaffirm	 the	 key	 flexibilities	 available	 under	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	 such	 as	 the	 power	 of	 WTO	
Members	 “to	 grant	 compulsory	 licences	 and	 the	 freedom	 to	 determine	 the	 grounds	 upon	 which	
such	licences	are	granted”,	as	well	as	“the	right	to	determine	what	constitutes	a	national	emergency	
or	 other	 circumstances	 of	 extreme	 urgency”	 (para.	 3,	 lit.	 b	 and	 c).	 The	 Doha	 Declaration	 also	
addressed	 the	 constraints	 on	 exports	 set	 out	 in	 Article	 31(f)	 TRIPS	 and	 instructed	 the	 Council	 for	
TRIPS	“to	find	an	expeditious	solution	to	this	problem”	(para.	6).		
	
The	scheme	that	was	ultimately	negotiated	under	this	mandate	envisioned	a	process	of	back-to-back	
compulsory	licences	that	would	enable	any	country	that	needs	medicines	at	lower	prices	than	those	
charged	by	local	patentees	to	seek	assistance	from	other	countries	able	and	willing	to	produce	the	
drugs	for	export	purposes,	without	interference	from	the	patentee	in	either	country.5	This	solution	
was	not	agreed	upon	without	a	 fight	and	was	 reached	only	after	 long	and	difficult	negotiations.	 It	
was	 initially	 embodied	 in	 a	Waiver,	 known	 as	 the	Decision	 of	 30	August	 2003	or	 the	 Paragraph	 6	
Decision.6	The	 Waiver	 will	 become	 permanent	 when	 enough	 countries	 (two	 thirds	 of	 the	 WTO	
membership)	sign	the	pending	Amendment	to	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	which	would	add	Article	31bis	
to	the	legal	text.	The	ratification	process	has	been	protracted	and	the	WTO	General	Council	decision		
of	30	November	2015	had	 to	yet	again	extend	 the	deadline	 to	31	December	2017.7	Until	 then	 the	
Waiver	remains	in	effect.	
	
Overall,	 the	Doha	Declaration	and	 the	2003	Waiver	decision	contributed	greatly	 to	confirming	 the	
flexibilities	under	TRIPS	and	clarified	 the	 legal	 situation	as	 to	 their	use	 for	public	health	purposes.	
Although	 the	 solution	 found	 is	 not	 optimal	 and	 was	 again	 in	 many	 respects	 shaped	 by	 the	
industrialized	 countries’	 interests	 in	 protecting	 the	 investment	 of	 pharmaceutical	 companies	
(Abbott/Reichman	2007),	it	still	provided	a	solid	basis	for	the	use	of	compulsory	licensing	to	ensure	
the	 availability	 and	 accessibility	 of	 life-saving	 drugs	 for	 poor	 people.	 Interestingly,	 despite	 this	
evolution	of	the	norm	and	the	room	for	action	created,	there	was	no	immediate	use	of	compulsory	
licensing.		
	
It	was	only	as	of	2006	that	a	practice	of	compulsory	licensing	of	pharmaceuticals	became	visible	and	
globally	spread.	At	that	time,	Thailand	issued	two	compulsory	licences	for	AIDS	drugs	and	one	for	a	
cardiovascular	 drug.	 In	 2007,	 Brazil	 issued	 a	 compulsory	 licence	 for	 government	 use	 of	 Merck’s	
patent	on	an	antiretroviral	drug.	Other	compulsory	licensing	procedures	that	led	to	agreements	with	
major	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 were	 reportedly	 initiated	 in	 Malaysia	 (2004),	 Indonesia	 (2004),	
Brazil	(2003	and	2007),	Zambia	(2004),	Zimbabwe	(2004)	and	Mozambique	(2004)	(for	an	overview,	
see	 Reichman	 2009;	 Beall/Kuhn	 2012).	 India’s	 first	 compulsory	 licence	was	 not	 issued	 until	 2012.	
This	was	for	the	chemotherapy	drug	sorafenib,	sold	by	Bayer	&	Co.	under	the	trademark	Nexavar®	
(Thomas	2014).	Natco	Pharma	Ltd.,	an	Indian	generic	firm,	was	awarded	the	licence;	it	was	required	
to	 pay	 a	 royalty	 at	 the	 rate	 of	 6%	 of	 net	 sales	 of	 the	 drug	 to	 Bayer.8	Very	 often	 the	 threat	 of	
																																								 																				
4	World	 Trade	 Organization,	 Declaration	 on	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 and	 Public	 Health,	 20	 November	 2001,	
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2	[hereinafter	the	Doha	Declaration].	
5	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	legal	mechanisms,	see	Matthews	2004;	Abbott/Reichman	2007.	
6	World	Trade	Organization,	Implementation	of	Paragraph	6	of	the	Doha	Declaration	on	the	TRIPS	Agreement	
and	Public	Health,	Decision	of	the	General	Council	of	30	August	2003,	WT/L/540,	30	August	2003.	
7 	WTO	 General	 Council,	 Amendment	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 –	 Fifth	 Extension	 of	 the	 Period	 for	 the	
Acceptance	by	Members	of	the	Protocol	Amending	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	WT/L/965,	2	December	2015.	
8	The	Intellectual	Property	Appellate	Board	of	India	upheld	the	Controller’s	decision	on	4	March	2013,	although	
it	increased	the	royalty	owed	to	Bayer	from	6%	to	7%.	
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compulsory	 licensing	 sufficed	 to	 trigger	 deals	 with	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 and	 a	 subsequent	
lowering	of	prices	(e.g.	Abbott/Reichman	2007;	Cohen	2007;	Love	2007;	Reichman	2009).	 It	should	
be	 noted	 that	 none	 of	 these	 cases	made	 use	 of	 the	 special	 regime	 under	 the	Waiver	 but	 rather	
utilized	 the	 conventional	 path	 under	 Article	 31	 TRIPS.	 In	 2007,	 Rwanda	 was	 the	 first	 country	 to	
actually	make	 use	 of	 the	Waiver	 through	 a	 compulsory	 licence	 for	 AIDS	 drugs,	 seeking	 assistance	
from	 Canada	 (Goodwin	 2008).	 This	 approach	 was	 not	 particularly	 efficient,	 as	 the	 procedures	 in	
Canada	were	fairly	cumbersome	and	lengthy	(Lybecker/Fowler	2009).	Rwanda’s	case	is	still	the	only	
precedent.		
	
To	understand	this	late	and	sporadic	use	of	compulsory	licensing,	we	need	to	contextualize	it	against	
the	backdrop	of	the	different	pressures	exerted	by	the	industrialized	countries,	the	pharmaceutical	
industry	in	both	developing	and	developed	countries,	and	local	and	global	civil	society	organizations.	
It	 must	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 idiosyncratic	 implementation	 practices	 in	 different	
countries,	each	of	which	has	their	own	set	of	economic,	political	and	social	considerations.	It	is	also	
important	to	note	that	the	institution	of	compulsory	licensing	as	a	tool	of	IP	policy	is	contentious.	Its	
use	could	potentially	trigger	a	number	of	effects,	which	may	work	to	the	detriment	rather	than	the	
benefit	 of	 developing	nations	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	 secure	 cheaper	medicines	 for	 their	 populations	
(e.g.	 Bird	 2009;	 Reichman	 2009).	 Compulsory	 licensing	 is	 also	 one	 tool	 among	 many	 that	
governments	may	want	to	consider	when	implementing	their	public	health	policies	(e.g.	Kapczynski	
2009),	and	while	singling	out	this	legal	instrument,	we	too	need	to	be	careful	to	frame	it	within	the	
larger	policy	toolbox.	
	
Some	 important	pressures	are	exerted	through	avenues	other	 that	 the	WTO,	 in	particular	 through	
preferential	trade	agreements	(PTAs).	While	this	topic	is	beyond	the	analytical	focus	of	this	chapter,	
it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 many	 of	 the	 flexibilities	 concerning	 governmental	 powers	 to	 grant	
compulsory	licences	for	patented	pharmaceuticals,	as	well	as	other	policy	space	presently	available	
under	TRIPS	may	be	severely	limited	by	the	one-sided	IP	provisions	of	some	PTAs.	In	particular,	the	
US	has	effectively	mobilized	its	legal	apparatus	and	bargaining	power	to	seize	back	some	of	the	lost	
ground	with	regard	to	pharmaceutical	patents.	As	well	as	“ratcheting	up”	of	IP	protection	(including	
in	 particular:	 extension	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 patentability;	 limits	 on	 patent	 revocation;	 patent	 term	
extension;	 prohibition	 of	 parallel	 importation;	 linkage	 between	 patent	 status	 and	 regulatory	
approval;	 limitations	 on	 compulsory	 licensing;	 extended	 data	 protection	 and	 data	 exclusivity,	 and	
obligatory	accession	to	other	multilateral	IP	agreements,	such	as	the	Patent	Cooperation	Treaty),	the	
US	is	attempting	to	directly	influence	and	constrain	the	pharmaceutical	coverage	programmes	of	its	
trading	 partners	 (Lopert/Gleeson	 2013).	 This	 campaign	 is	 accompanied	 by	 considerable	 political	
pressure	from	the	US	Trade	Representative	(USTR)	and	other	governmental	agencies,	as	well	as	from	
individual	pharmaceutical	companies	with	economic	clout.	This	pressure	has	a	strong	 impact	upon	
the	political	environment	as	a	whole	and	also	on	 the	choice	and	 timing	of	 the	concrete	measures	
taken	 (Mercurio	 2006:	 215-238;	 Abbott/Reichman	 2007:	 958-966;	 Dwyer	 2007;	 Reichman	 2007;	
Lopert/Gleeson	 2013).	 At	 the	 multilateral	 level,	 pressure	 is	 exerted	 through	 the	 WIPO	 Standing	
Committee	on	the	Law	of	Patents	and	the	concerted	efforts	of	OECD	countries	in	this	venue	to	reach	
agreement	on	a	Substantive	Patent	Law	Treaty	(SPLT).	The	SPLT	seeks	deeper	harmonization	of	the	
rules	 concerning	 the	 drafting,	 filing	 and	 examination	 of	 patent	 applications,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 the	
requirements	for	patentability.	Reichman	and	Cooper	Dreyfuss	(2007)	have	argued	that,	if	adopted,	
the	SPLT	 is	 likely,	yet	again,	to	erode	existing	flexibilities	under	the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	preclude	
“virtually	every	pro-competitive	option	still	 left	open	–	from	exceptions	to	patentability,	limitations	
on	 exclusive	 rights,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 imposing	 compulsory	 licenses”	 (Abbott/Reichman	 2007:	
961).	
	
This	combined	pressure	should	not	be	underestimated	and	may	have	been	one	of	 the	reasons	 for	
the	 relatively	 late	start	of	 the	compulsory	 licensing	practice.	Another	critical	 contextualizing	 factor	
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relates	 to	 the	different	 implementation	 strategies	 chosen	by	different	 countries,	which	have	been	
determined	 by	 the	 interplay	 of	 domestic	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 forces,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 the	
particular	 characteristics	 of	 the	 state	 (Yeung	 2005;	 Eimer/Lütz	 2010).	 These	 particularities	 raise	
questions	concerning	the	feasibility	of	policy	diffusion	between	emerging	countries.	The	next	section	
looks	 in	 detail	 at	 the	 kind	 of	 processes	 whereby	 policies	 diffuse,	 thus	 providing	 an	 analytical	
framework	to	evaluate	whether	and	how	the	diffusion	of	compulsory	licensing	has	taken	place.		
	
	
III.	Diffusion	processes	and	compulsory	licensing		
	
The	 late	and	cautious	use	of	compulsory	 licensing	 is	noteworthy,	given	that	by	2005	the	transition	
periods	 given	 to	most	developing	 countries	 to	make	 their	patent	 legislation	TRIPS-compatible	had	
already	expired.9	Compulsory	 licensing,	despite	generating	an	 intense	backlash	from	multinationals	
based	 in	 industrialized	 countries	 has	 been	 followed	 by	 what	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 cascade	 of	 similar	
efforts	by	emerging	economies,	including	Brazil	and	India	(see	Beall/Kuhn	2012).	This	curious	timing	
poses	an	 interesting	question,	namely	whether	there	has	been	coordination	of	domestic	 initiatives	
aimed	at	preserving	TRIPS	flexibilities	between	emerging	countries,	or	whether	less	institutionalized	
and	 subtler	 diffusion	 processes	may	 be	 taking	 place.	 Given	 that	 emerging	 countries	 have	 formed	
coalitions	 on	 IP-related	 issues	 at	 international	 organizations,	 and	 have	 even	 created	 specific	 fora,	
such	as	 the	 India-Brazil-South	Africa	Dialogue	Forum	 (IBSA),10	it	 is	 conceivable	 that	policies	diffuse	
through	such	venues.	On	the	other	hand,	civil	society	organizations	and	epistemic	communities	have	
been	 vocal	 and	heavily	 involved	 in	 furthering	 access	 to	 health	 initiatives	 –	 so,	 they	 too	may	have	
played	a	role.	
	
Policy	 transfer	 and	 diffusion	 processes	 have	 received	 much	 scholarly	 attention	 in	 recent	 years	
(Simmons/Dobbin/Garret	 2006;	 Keohane	 2009;	 Marsh/Sharman	 2009;	 Gilardi	 2012).	 At	 the	 most	
basic	level,	international	diffusion	takes	place	when	government	policy	decisions	are	conditioned	by	
prior	 policy	 choices	 in	 other	 countries	 (Simmons/Dobbin/Garrett	 2006).	 Taking	 this	 broad	
conceptualization,	 and	 considering	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	 compulsory	 licensing,	 it	 seems	
plausible	 that	decisions	 taken	by	 governments	on	 compulsory	 licensing	were	 conditioned	by	prior	
policy	choices	in	other	jurisdictions.	However,	this	does	not	explain	the	mechanisms	through	which	
policy	 diffusion	 may	 take	 place.	 Gilardi	 (2012)	 argues	 that	 diffusion	 needs	 to	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	
process	(and	not	an	outcome)	which	does	not	necessarily	 lead	to	convergence.	While	convergence	
considers	 the	end	effect	 (how	many	countries	have	adopted	a	given	policy),	diffusion	 looks	at	 the	
process	 whereby	 a	 pattern	 of	 adoption	 is	 established.	 There	 are	 several	 mechanisms	 by	 which	
diffusion	may	 take	place:	 coercion,	 competition,	 learning	and	emulation.	Coercion	usually	 involves	
some	 form	 of	 conditionality	 and	 often	 relies	 on	 market	 power;	 while	 competition	 derives	 from	
economic	rivalry	(e.g.	in	cases	where	policies	implemented	by	a	third	party	may	entail	losing	market	
share).	 Learning	 and	 emulation	 are	more	 cooperative	mechanisms;	 the	main	 difference	 between	
them	is	that	 learning	follows	instrumental	purposes,	whereas	emulation	is	normative	(as	discussed	
further	below).	Neither	 coercion	nor	 competition	 seem	adequate	explanations	 for	 the	diffusion	of	
compulsory	 licensing	 in	 the	 two	 cases	 analysed	 in	 this	 chapter	 (Brazil	 and	 India),	 as	 power	
asymmetries	and	economic	competition	between	these	countries	are	largely	absent	in	the	relevant	
field	(pharmaceuticals).	The	focus	of	the	analysis	is	therefore	on	learning	and	emulation	processes.			
																																								 																				
9	As	of	2005,	developing	countries	have	been	required	to	provide	at	 least	20	years	of	patent	protection	to	a	
broad	range	of	products,	including	pharmaceutical	products,	and	mailboxes	with	pending	patent	applications	
were	 opened	 and	 began	 to	 be	 processed.	 A	 few	 least-developed	 countries	 (LDCs)	 remain	 exempt	 from	
protecting	 patents	 until	 2021,	 under	 the	 latest	 extension	 of	 the	 transition	 period.	 See	 World	 Trade	
Organization,	 Extension	 of	 the	 Transition	 Period	 Under	 Article	 66.1	 for	 Least-Developed	 Country	 Members,	
Decision	of	the	Council	for	TRIPS	of	11	June	2013,	IP/C/64,	12	June	2013.	
10	http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/	(last	accessed	15	March	2016).	
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Rationalist	scholars	have	focused	on	the	effects	of	bounded	rationality	and	heuristics	in	learning	(e.g.	
Simon	1991;	Gilardi	2012)	whereas	scholars	looking	at	ideational	factors	(e.g.	Haas	1992)	have	paid	
particular	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 of	 groups	 of	 experts	 and	 their	 socialization	 effects.	 Bounded	
rationality	 refers	 to	 the	 limits	 faced	 by	 individuals	 in	 solving	 complex	 problems.	 Given	 these	
limitations,	 individuals	 (and	 organizations)	 are	 likely	 to	 seek	 heuristics,	 cognitive	 shortcuts,	 which	
ease	 the	 cognitive	 load	 of	 reaching	 a	 decision.	 Under	 this	 logic,	 the	 fact	 that	 complex	 or	
controversial	 policies	 (such	 as	 compulsory	 licensing)	 have	 been	 successfully	 enacted,	 provides	
incentives	for	other	governments	to	follow	suit.	This	effect	is	likely	to	be	stronger	if	the	government	
that	 initially	 enacted	 the	 policy	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 least	 likely	 case	 (Gilardi	 2012).	 Another	
mechanism	 by	 which	 learning	 processes	 may	 take	 place	 is	 through	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemic	
communities	 or	 networks	 of	 professionals	 with	 shared	 beliefs.	 These	 groups	 can	 provide	
governments	 with	 policy	 advice	 on	 complex	 issues:	 “as	 demands	 for	 such	 information	 arise,	
networks	 or	 communities	 of	 specialists	 capable	 of	 providing	 the	 information	 emerge	 and	
proliferate	 …	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 an	 epistemic	 community	 consolidates	 bureaucratic	 power	 within	
national	administrations	and	international	secretariats,	it	stands	to	institutionalize	its	influence	and	
insinuate	its	views	into	broader	international	politics”	(Haas	1992:	4).		
	
Whereas	diffusion	through	 learning	occurs	as	 the	result	of	 the	objective	characteristics	of	policies,	
emulation	 follows	 their	 normative	 and	 socially	 constructed	 properties	 (Gilardi	 2012).	 From	 this	
viewpoint,	 socialization	 processes	 occur	 though	 repeated	 interaction,	which	 in	 turn	may	 induce	 a	
change	 in	 preferences.	 In	 emulation	 processes,	 norm	entrepreneurs,	 such	 as	NGOs,	 play	 a	 crucial	
role	 in	 linking	domestic	debates	to	 international	norms	(Finnemore/Sikkink	1998).	To	gain	a	better	
understanding	 of	 the	 processes	 at	 play,	 the	 next	 sub-section	 compares	 the	 implementation	 of	
compulsory	licensing	in	Brazil	and	India.		
	
Domestic	implementation	
	
While	 both	 Brazil	 and	 India	 have	 been	 vocal	 on	 the	 international	 scene	 and	 have	 sought	 the	
adoption	of	mechanisms	that	ensure	the	freedom	of	the	state	to	shape	and	pursue	its	own	IP	policy,	
their	 implementation	of	compulsory	 licensing	schemes	and	the	effective	results	of	these	processes	
are	very	different.	This	difference	is	all	the	more	puzzling	when	one	considers	the	other	similarities	
between	 India	 and	 Brazil	 as	 emerging	 economies	 with	 sufficient	 industrial	 capacity	 and	 R&D	
potential	for	pharmaceuticals,	as	well	as	the	prioritized	government	policies	to	both	further	develop	
the	 domestic	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 and	 to	 fight	 against	 HIV/AIDS	 and	 other	 epidemic	 diseases	
(Eimer/Lütz,	2010:	136).	Also	it	is	noteworthy	that	both	India	and	Brazil	had	to	amend	their	domestic	
laws	to	bring	them	into	conformity	with	the	TRIPS	by	2005.	
	
India,	 unlike	 most	 developing	 countries,	 took	 full	 advantage	 of	 the	 ten-year	 transition	 period	 to	
ensure	patent	protection	for	pharmaceuticals	–	which	of	course	allowed	it	to	develop	and	maintain	
its	massive	generic	production	capacity	 for	drugs	that	were	otherwise	on-patent	 in	developed	and	
many	developing	countries	(Abbott/Reichman	2007:	934).	Perhaps	surprisingly	when	compared	with	
the	active	role	that	India	played	in	the	adoption	of	the	2001	Doha	Declaration	on	Public	Health	and	
the	2003	Waiver	Decision,	it	was	only	at	a	relatively	late	stage	of	the	TRIPS	implementation	activities	
that	 India	 included	 provisions	 on	 compulsory	 licensing	 with	 regard	 to	 medicines	
(Chakraborty/Singhvi	2009).	 It	 is	also	noteworthy	 in	this	context	that	the	adopted	regime	does	not	
provide	 for	either	straightforward	or	swift	use	of	compulsory	 licensing.	The	 legal	 terms,	as	well	as	
the	institutional	responsibilities	are	also	often	unclear.		
	
As	has	been	well	documented,	while	the	issuance	of	compulsory	licences	in	India	may	in	theory	be	
initiated	 both	 by	 the	 government	 and	 the	 local	 manufacturers,	 the	 numerous	 procedural	 and	
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substantive	hindrances,	as	well	as	the	specific	dynamics	of	the	interplay	between	governmental	and	
non-governmental	agencies	and	the	private	sector,	severely	restrict	the	opportunity	of	the	state	to	
act	 proactively	 (Chaudhuri	 2005;	 Eimer/Lütz	 2010).	 The	 specificities	 of	 the	 Indian	 generic	 drug	
industry	are	also	such	 that	 it	 tends	 to	 innovate	either	 incrementally	 through	minor	adaptations	of	
existing	pharmaceuticals,	which	are	patentable	abroad,	or	 through	 cooperation	with	multinational	
pharmaceutical	 corporations	 (Eimer/Lütz	2010).	 This	 situation	drastically	 reduces	 the	 incentives	 to	
lobby	for	swift	and	efficient	compulsory	licensing	mechanisms,	as	well	as	to	make	use	of	the	existing	
schemes.	Furthermore,	it	appears	that	the	majority	of	Indian	R&D	is	focused	on	“western”	diseases,	
such	 as	 diabetes	 and	 cardiovascular	 diseases,	 and	 tends	 to	 neglect	 local	 needs.	 This	 has	 been	
confirmed	in	reality	by	the	limited	practice	of	compulsory	licensing	in	India,	as	well	as	ultimately	by	
the	 insufficient	 supply	 of	 drugs	 for	 those	 in	 need,	 in	 particular	 for	 HIV/AIDS	 patients	 (Eimer/Lütz	
2010).	This	situation	may	have	changed	following	 India’s	decision	of	2012	on	compulsory	 licensing	
for	sorafenib,	by	potentially	allowing	any	number	of	generics	manufacturers	to	challenge	patented	
medicines	so	long	as	they	pay	royalties	to	the	original	manufacturer	and	seek	to	lower	the	price	of	
the	drug	in	order	to	make	it	more	affordable	to	Indian	patients.11	
	
Brazil,	on	the	other	hand,	and	as	discussed	in	more	detail	below,	has	chosen	a	different	approach,	
which	has	been	 less	onerous	and	much	more	efficient.	For	the	grant	of	compulsory	 licensing,	with	
regard	 to	 local	 manufacturers,	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 prove	 that	 a	 patented	 technology	 is	 not	 locally	
employed.	 If	 the	 technology	 is	 not	 used	 in	 Brazil	 three	 years	 after	 the	 sealing	 of	 a	 patent,	 the	
Brazilian	Patent	Office	is	entitled	to	issue	a	compulsory	licence,	against	which	no	appeal	is	allowed.	
Compulsory	licences	can	be	directly	requested	by	the	government	too,	and	this	path	appears	to	be	
the	 more	 important	 in	 Brazil.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 can	 demand	 a	 compulsory	 licence	 in	 any	
situation	of	emergency,	which	covers	for	instance	HIV/AIDS,	and	other	epidemic	diseases.	There	are	
no	requirements	attached	 to	negotiate	with	 the	affected	patentee,	and	 the	state	 is	well	equipped	
with	 pharmaceutical	 laboratories	 that	 can	 actually	 produce	 the	 generic	 medicines,	 as	 well	 as	
facilities	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 development	 of	 improved	 formulas	 (Cassier/Correa	 2007;	 Eimer/Lütz	
2010).	 In	practice,	Brazil	has	made	apt	use	of	 compulsory	 licensing	and	effectively	 catered	 for	 the	
supply	of	medicines	its	most	needy	domestic	constituencies	(Eimer/Lütz	2010).	
	
Against	the	backdrop	of	these	TRIPS	implementation	practices	and	their	evolution	in	India	and	Brazil,	
it	 has	 been	maintained,	with	 good	 reason,	 that	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 public	 authorities’	 regulatory	
capacity,	very	often	in	combination	with	the	varying	involvement	of	the	civil	society,	 is	decisive	for	
the	 failure	 or	 fulfilment	 of	 public	 health	 policy	 goals	 (Eimer/Lütz	 2010).	 In	 particular,	 India	 is	
considered	 to	be	one	of	 the	 few	developing	countries	with	“access	 to	national	or	 regional	experts	
capable	 of	 tailoring	 the	 implementation	 of	 international	 IP	 obligations	 to	 foster	 national	
development	objectives”	(Deere	Birkbeck	2008:	310).	It	is	thus	intriguing	that	India	has	taken	so	long	
to	 follow	 other	 emerging	 countries	 such	 as	 Thailand	 and	 Brazil	 in	 issuing	 compulsory	 licences.	
Furthermore,	 India’s	 government	 has	 not	 played	 a	 relevant	 role;	 instead,	 the	 private	 sector	 has	
initiated	compulsory	licensing	procedures.		
	
From	 this	 overview,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 policies	 have	 not	 converged;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 compulsory	
licensing	 practices	 have	 differed	 significantly.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 coordination	 or	
diffusion	mechanisms	are	absent.	The	next	section	provides	an	explanation	for	the	differences	in	the	
compulsory	 licensing	 regimes	 of	 India	 and	 Brazil,	 and	 seeks	 to	 determine	 whether	 coordination,	
learning	or	emulation	processes	have	acted	as	drivers	for	the	diffusion	of	compulsory	licensing.	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
11 	http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/article/1034/in-landmark-ruling-indian-generics-
manufacturer-obtains-compulsory-license.aspx	(last	accessed	15	March	2016).	
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III.	Explaining	the	implementation	and	diffusion	of	compulsory	licensing	in	India	and	Brazil			
	
India	
	
Positions	 taken	 by	 India	 on	 access	 to	 health	 domestically	 and	 in	 multilateral	 fora	 have	 at	 times	
lacked	coherence.12	This	is	largely	the	result	of	domestic	dynamics	that	need	to	be	understood	if	one	
is	to	make	sense	of	Indian	IP	policies,	including	compulsory	licensing.	On	the	basis	of	extensive	field	
research	carried	out	during	the	winter	of	2014	in	New	Delhi,	we	find	that	that	these	dynamics	have	
been	driven	not	only	by	 India’s	political	economy	 (particularly	 the	 role	of	 the	different	parts	of	 its	
pharmaceutical	 industry),	 but	 also	 by	 its	 regulatory	 capacities,	 ideational	 aspects,	 and	 electoral	
calculations.	 The	 capacity	 of	 the	 Indian	 state	 to	 engage	 in	 multilateral	 negotiations	 is	 strongly	
affected	 by	 the	 need	 to	 achieve	 domestic	 consensus	 –	 particularly	 between	 the	 main	 ministries	
concerned:	 commerce	 and	 industry,	 foreign,	 finance,	 agriculture,	 rural	 development	 and	
communications,	as	well	as	 information	technology	 (Madan	2013).	Each	of	 these	ministries	has	de	
facto	veto	power	in	the	fields	under	its	domain	and	often	domestic	negotiations	become	even	more	
cumbersome	and	complicated	than	international	ones.13	Domestic	negotiations	are	long	and	involve	
numerous	rounds.	Until	recently,	States	were	not	directly	involved	in	these	discussions.	This	tends	to	
create	 problems	 once	 agreements	 come	 to	 be	 implemented	 given	 that	 States	 have	 broad	
competences	 in	many	economic	fields.	Difficulties	 in	 implementing	policies	have	been	exacerbated	
by	ongoing	fragmentation	of	the	Indian	polity,	as	the	rise	of	regional	political	parties	has	raised	the	
profile	of	 some	States.	This	 fragmentation	 is	 increased	by	 the	 fact	 that	not	all	ministries	have	 the	
same	expertise	in	international	negotiations.14		
	
As	already	mentioned,	India’s	compulsory	licensing	practice	has	been	market-	and	not	government-
driven.	We	 find	 this	 to	be	 largely	a	 result	of	 the	 importance	of	 the	generics	 industry	and	divisions	
between	government	ministries	 (see	 also	 Eimer/Lütz	 2010).	While	 TRIPS	posed	a	 challenge	 to	 the	
survival	of	the	thriving	generics	industry15	and	triggered	strong	mobilization	and	opposition	towards	
stricter	patenting	requirements,	the	Council	for	Scientific	and	Industrial	Research	(CSIR)	acted	as	an	
important	counterweight.	This	reflects,	first,	the	significant	increase	in	patenting	taking	place	in	India,	
and,	 second,	 that	 most	 Indian	 patent	 applications	 filed	 abroad	 were	 filed	 by	 the	 CSIR	 (Malhotra	
																																								 																				
12	The	impact	of	India’s	conflicting	interests	in	multilateral	negotiations	can	best	be	observed	in	the	context	of	
the	 launching	of	the	Development	Agenda	by	Brazil	and	Argentina	at	the	2004	WIPO	General	Assembly.	The	
fact	 that	 India	 was	 not	 a	 co-sponsor	 of	 this	 initiative	 (even	 if	 it	 later	 supported	 it)	 is	 puzzling,	 considering	
India’s	long	leadership	tradition	on	development	issues	and	great	expertise	in	global	IP	policy.	Fernandes	et	al.	
(2012)	argue	that	the	breakdown	of	the	traditional	alliance	between	Brazil	and	India	on	patent	issues	resulted	
from	a	fundamental	divergence	between	the	two	countries	as	to	the	role	of	their	respective	patent	systems.	
This	difference	made	coordination	at	IBSA	problematic	and	became	evident	from	India’s	lukewarm	support	for	
the	 Development	 Agenda.	 India	 distanced	 itself	 from	 the	 negotiations	 taking	 place	 at	 WIPO	 and	 only	
supported	 the	Development	Agenda	 following	 the	 (first)	 IBSA	Summit	of	 September	2006.	According	 to	 the	
authors,	while	Brazil	followed	a	long-held	position	that	considers	the	need	for	flexibility	in	international	rules	
taking	 into	account	 the	development	needs	of	 the	South;	 India	 (at	 least	 initially)	 supported	 stronger	patent	
protection.		
13	Interview,	former	Indian	trade	negotiator,	New	Delhi,	11	January	2014.		
14	Interview,	Indian	economist,	Jawaharlal	Nehru	University,	New	Delhi,	7	January	2014.		
15	This	 is	 rather	a	generalization.	The	generics	 industry	 is	not	a	unitary	actor,	particularly	 since	consolidation	
over	the	past	decade	has	led	to	big	pharmaceutical	multinationals	buying	Indian	generics	producers.		
Some	 of	 these	 acquisitions	 seem	 to	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 less	 vocal	 position	 being	 taken	 by	 previously	 vocal	
generic	drugs	actors	 such	as	Ranbaxy	after	being	acquired	by	 the	 Japanese	 firm,	Daichi.	 Furthermore,	 some	
generics	producers	have	also	started	investing	significant	amounts	in	R&D	and	have	joined	strategic	alliances	
with	 big	 pharmaceutical	 corporations.	 Despite	 this,	 from	 interviews	 with	 industry	 representatives	 and	
government	officials	 throughout	 January	and	February	2014	 it	was	clear	 that	 the	generics	 industry	 is	 still	an	
important	and	influential	voice	resisting	patents.	This	 is	particularly	the	case	for	drugs	that	are	 likely	to	reap	
them	significant	economic	benefits	such	as	those	related	to	cancer	treatments.		
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2008).	This	perspective	can	be	confirmed	by	the	creation	of	the	National	Knowledge	Commission	in	
2005	launched	by	the	then	Prime	Minister	Singh.	Two	of	the	five	key	objectives	of	the	Commission	
were	related	to	IP	rights,	namely	to	“improve	the	management	of	institutions	generating	Intellectual	
Property;	 [and]	 improve	 protection	 of	 IPRs	 and	 promote	 knowledge”.16	This	 position	 (which	 also	
went	against	India’s	traditional	stance	on	patents)	was	nonetheless	strongly	opposed	and	eventually	
led	to	a	policy	reversal.17	The	mediatization	and	politicization	of	the	issue	of	access	to	medicines	and	
ensuing	 mobilization	 of	 civil	 society	 organizations,	 together	 with	 the	 powerful	 interests	 of	 the	
pharmaceutical	generics	industry	organized	under	the	Indian	Pharmaceutical	Alliance	and	the	Indian	
Drug	Manufacturers	Association	among	others,	contributed	to	this	policy	shift.18	Renewed	emphasis	
on	flexibility	is	visible	both	in	multilateral	negotiations	(particularly	India’s	leading	role	at	the	TRIPS	
Council)	and	domestically	with	the	implementation	of	legal	reforms	such	as	section	3(d)	of	the	2005	
Indian	Patent	Act	limiting	the	scope	of	patentability.	There	have	also	been	other	significant	judicial	
reforms,	such	as	the	Right	to	Information	Act	passed	in	October	2005,	and	an	increase	in	the	use	of	
public	 interest	 litigation	 (PIL)	 allowing	 NGOs,	 individuals	 and	 other	 institutions	 the	 right	 to	 file	
lawsuits.	This	also	suggests	the	courts	play	an	 increasingly	relevant	role	 in	domestic	politics	and	 in	
other	fields	such	as	trade	policy.		
	
To	sum	up,	unlike	Brazil	(see	next	section),	where	the	government	was	central	to	the	enactment	of	
compulsory	 licensing,	 in	 the	case	of	 India	 the	government	played	a	more	 limited	 role,	 largely	as	a	
result	 of	 its	 conflicting	 domestic	 priorities.	 This	 in	 turn	 allowed	 other	 actors	 such	 as	 generic	 drug	
manufacturers,	civil	society	organizations,	epistemic	communities	(in	particular	of	legal	scholars)	and	
the	 courts	 to	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 ensuring	 access	 to	 health	 through	 several	 policies	 and	 legal	
initiatives,	which	included	compulsory	licensing.	This	has	had	the	paradoxical	effect	of	making	India	a	
policy	 entrepreneur;	 after	 a	 slow	 start,	 it	 has	 become	 a	 leading	 jurisdiction	 implementing	 IP	
flexibilities.	 These	 innovations,	 such	 as	 the	 aforementioned	 section	 3(d)	 of	 its	 patent	 act,	 are	 the	
focus	 of	 much	 attention	 and	 debate	 among	 scholars	 and	 policy-makers	 in	 several	 developing	
countries	such	as	Brazil	and	South	Africa.		
	
Brazil	
	
While	domestic	dynamics	have	also	played	a	role	in	Brazil,	these	have	for	the	most	part	supported	
an	active	role	 in	promoting	access	to	health	policies.19	This	might	help	explain	why	 in	Brazil,	unlike	
India,	the	government	has	taken	a	direct	role	in	requesting	compulsory	licences.20	The	lead	promoter	
of	access	to	medicines	in	Brazil	has	been	its	health	ministry,	together	with	civil	society	organizations.	
While	in	India	the	CSIR	and	the	generics	industry	had	largely	conflicting	interests,	in	Brazil	there	was	
no	significant	generics	 industry	 to	speak	of	but	nor	was	 there	a	powerful	actor	similar	 to	 the	CSIR	
promoting	a	patent	culture.21	If	one	compares	the	growth	of	patent	filings	by	India	and	Brazil	during	
the	past	decade,	it	is	clear	that	Brazil	has	experienced	relatively	little	growth,	while	the	patent	filings	
of	 India	 (together	with	China)	have	had	 the	highest	growth	among	non-industrialized	countries.	 In	
2005,	India	registered	four	hundred	and	three	patents	in	the	United	States,	China	five	hundred	and	
																																								 																				
16	See	press	release	of	Government	of	India:	http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=9576	(last	accessed	
15	March	2016).	
17	Interview,	academic	involved	in	these	discussions,	New	Delhi,	16	January	2014.	
18	Interview,	representative	of	the	Indian	Drug	Manufacturers	Association,	New	Delhi,	20	February	2014.		
19	Interview,	Brazilian	trade	negotiator,	Geneva,	18	September	2012.	
20	Fifteen	interviews	with	diplomats,	policy-makers,	academics	and	NGO	representatives	in	Brasilia	and	Rio	de	
Janeiro,	July/August	2014.		
21	The	Brazilian	Patent	Office	has	perhaps	been	the	most	significant	actor	promoting	a	patents	culture	in	Brazil,	
at	least	throughout	the	mandate	of	of	its	previous	head	(Jorge	Avila).	However,	despite	the	tensions	between	
INPI	and	the	Health	Ministry	(among	others)	the	fact	that	Brazil	has	an	inter-ministerial	group	on	IP	(GIPI)	and	
the	strong	role	played	by	the	Executive	Branch	means	these	divisions	have	been	less	consequential	than	has	
been	the	case	in	India.		
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sixty	five,	and	Brazil	only	ninety-eight.22	In	2013,	Brazil	filed	769	patent	applications	in	the	US,	while	
China	filed	15,093	and	India	some	6,600.23	While	the	pro-market	reforms	brought	by	the	Collor	and	
Cardoso	administration	tended	to	tilt	the	balance	in	favour	of	stronger	patenting	regulations	(in	part	
resulting	 from	significant	pressure	 from	 the	United	States),	 the	opposition	 to	 these	measures	was	
such	that	this	position	proved	untenable.	Furthermore,	resisting	an	expansion	of	a	“patents	agenda”	
is	part	of	a	long	developmentalist	tradition	espoused	among	others	by	the	Brazilian	foreign	ministry	
(Itamaraty),	which	is	one	of	the	best	staffed	and	most	professional	among	the	emerging	countries.	
Opposition	 to	 this	 developmentalist	 stance	 has	 mainly	 come	 from	 the	 Brazilian	 Congress	 where	
attempts	at	reforming	the	patent	 legislation	to	make	it	more	flexible	have	been	blocked	for	a	 long	
time.	As	Montero	(2014)	argues,	Brazilian	executives	have	a	long	tradition	of	overcoming	blockages	
in	 Congress	 through	 Executive	 Orders	 (medida	 provisória);	 this	 explains	 why,	 despite	 opposition	
from	the	Brazilian	Congress,	the	government	has	been	able	to	further	flexibilities.	To	sum	up,	unlike	
India,	 political	 demands	 and	 long-held	 views	 on	 development	 among	 key	 ministries	 in	 Brazil	
(particularly	the	Health	Ministry	and	Itamaraty)	have	supported	government-led	efforts	to	promote	
IP	flexibilities	including	compulsory	licensing.			
	
Coordination,	learning	or	emulation?	
	
The	notable	differences	between	the	positions	of	Brazil	and	India	in	international	organizations,	their	
divergent	domestic	practice,	and	anecdotal	evidence	obtained	from	interviews	with	policy-makers	in	
both	countries,	all	suggest	that	coordinated	intergovernmental	efforts	have	not	driven	the	spread	of	
compulsory	licensing	practices.	Civil	society	organizations,	on	the	other	hand,	seem	to	have	played	a	
major	 role	 in	 spreading	knowledge	and	awareness	of	practices	such	as	compulsory	 licensing.24	The	
Third	World	Network	and	Médecins	Sans	Frontières	(MSF)	stand	out.	These	international	civil	society	
organisations	and	transnational	activist	networks	may	be	considered	the	main	actors	through	which	
normative	persuasion	(and	as	a	result	emulation)	has	taken	place.	They	have	also	spurred	 learning	
by	providing	information.		
	
There	 is	 another	 relevant	 and	 more	 direct	 source	 of	 contributions	 to	 learning	 processes	 in	 the	
diffusion	 of	 compulsory	 licensing.	 Experts	 such	 as	 academics,	 think	 tanks	 and	 legal	 firms	 all	 play	
relevant	 roles	 in	 policy-making	 in	 both	 countries.	 Indeed,	 in	 India,	 one	 way	 of	 solving	 inter-
ministerial	 disputes	 has	 been	 to	 delegate	 delicate	 issues	 to	 such	 actors.	 In	 Brazil,	 relevant	 fora	
include	 the	 Getulio	 Vargas	 Foundation,	 which	 has	 promoted	 a	 series	 of	 international	 seminars	
involving	 academics	 and	 legal	 practitioners	 to	 discuss	 IP	 flexibilities.	 Indian	 legal	 practitioners	 and	
scholars	 have	 also	 participated	 actively	 in	 these	 and	 other	 similar	 international	 academic	 and	
professional	venues.	Legal	practitioners	and	academics	have	been	crucial	actors	 in	these	epistemic	
communities;25	which	also	 include	 representatives	 from	major	 Indian	 legal	 firms.	 India	has	at	 least	
five	‘boutique’	legal	firms	that	have	provided	the	government	with	legal	capacities	and	advised	and	
represented	 the	Government	 of	 India	 in	WTO	disputes	 (Shaffer/Nedumpara/Sinha	 2014).	 It	 is	 not	
unlikely	 that	 these	 networks	 of	 knowledge-based	 experts	 (or	 epistemic	 communities)	 influence	
policy	 by	 helping	 states	 identify	 their	 interests,	 frame	 debates,	 and	 propose	 specific	 policies,	
including	on	compulsory	licensing.	Transnational	epistemic	communities	may	influence	state	policies	
by	pointing	out	specific	 issues	and	as	a	result	“decision	makers	in	one	state	may,	in	turn,	 influence	
the	 interests	 and	 behaviour	 of	 other	 states,	 thereby	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 convergent	 state	
behaviour	 and	 policy	 coordination	 informed	 by	 the	 causal	 beliefs	 and	 policy	 preferences	 of	 the	
epistemic	 community”	 (Haas	1992:	4).	Our	 field	 research	 found	evidence	of	 such	a	process	 taking	
																																								 																				
22	Information	on	US	Patent	filings	is	available	at	www.uspto.gov	(last	accessed	15	March	2016).	
23	Information	on	all	IP	filings	worldwide	is	available	at	www.ipstats.wipo.int	(last	accessed	15	March	2016).	
24	Interviews,	India	WTO	Centre,	New	Delhi,	29	January	2014.	
25	Interviews,	legal	practitioners,	New	Delhi,	31	January	2014.	
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place	and	suggested	some	venues	(mentioned	above)	where	these	learning	and	emulation	processes	
have	occurred.		
	
IV.	Conclusions	
	
The	assessment	of	the	Indian	and	Brazilian	experiences	as	elaborated	in	this	chapter	shows	diverging	
approaches	 in	 their	 domestic	 implementation	 of	 TRIPS	 flexibilities	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 compulsory	
licensing.	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 there	has	been	 little	or	no	coordination	between	 the	countries	and	
there	is	no	indication	that	their	shared	positions	on	the	international	scene	have	led	to	convergent	
practices	domestically.	Domestic	and	international	positions	are	not	always	coherent	and	overall	we	
find	IP	policies	Brazil	and	India	to	be	in	flux.	Rather,	the	national	specificities	in	terms	of	innovation	
systems,	 governmental	 intervention,	 industry	 positioning,	 and	health	 policies,	 to	 name	but	 a	 few,	
appear	to	have	shaped	the	current	situation	 in	the	 laws	permitting	compulsory	 licensing	and	 in	 its	
actual	use.	It	would	however	be	wrong	to	assume	that	no	diffusion	has	occurred	and/or	is	currently	
under	way.	Learning	does	seem	to	take	place.	In	particular,	the	existence	of	an	epistemic	community	
involved	 in	 policy-making	 processes	 suggests	 that	 this	 was	 a	 likely	 venue	 for	 the	 diffusion	 of	
compulsory	 licensing	practices.	The	 influence	of	these	networks	of	experts	consisting	of	academics	
and	 legal	 practitioners	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 helped	 by	 networks	 of	 NGOs	 (e.g.	 the	 Third	 World	
Network	and	MSF)	and	national	media,	which	contributed	 to	 the	salience	and	politicization	of	 the	
issue	 of	 access	 to	 health	 and	 may	 have	 driven	 emulation	 processes	 in	 addition	 to	 learning.	 To	
understand	 and	 clarify	 the	 effects	 of	 these	 diffusion	 processes,	we	need	 to	 carefully	 consider	 the	
tools	available.	Compulsory	licensing	is	only	one	of	them	and	other	instruments,	for	instance	Article	
3(d)	of	the	Indian	Patent	Act,	may	have	offered	better	avenues	of	 IP	resistance.	One	also	needs	to	
take	 into	 account,	 as	 our	 analysis	 has	 shown,	 the	 whole	 spectrum	 of	 actors	 involved,	 such	 as	
networks	of	experts	or	even	individual	legal	entrepreneurs,	and	the	interplay	between	domestic	and	
international	 positions.	 Finally,	 an	 important	 theoretical	 finding	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 that	 the	 South–
South	 diffusion	 of	 policies	 relies	 strongly	 on	 informal	 mechanisms,	 where	 individuals	 within	
governmental	bodies,	research	institutions,	legal	firms,	or	civil	society	organizations	play	crucial	roles.	
This	 is	 relevant	 inasmuch	 as	 the	 existing	 literature	 has	 mainly	 focused	 on	 Western	 diffusion	
processes,	which	tend	to	be	much	more	institutionalized	and	thus	of	a	different	nature.	The	fact	that	
an	 alternative	 type	 of	 (South-South)	 diffusion	 is	 taking	 place	 is	 an	 interesting	 avenue	 for	 further	
research.							
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